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We present a conceptual framework to better understand the interaction between settlement and the
emergence of de facto property rights on frontiers prior to governments establishing and enforcing
de jure property rights. In this framework, potential rents associated with more exclusivity drives “demand”
for commons arrangements but demand is not a sufficient explanation; norms and politics matter. At
some point enhanced scarcity will drive demand for more exclusivity beyond which can be sustained
with commons arrangements. Claimants will therefore petition government for de jure property rights
to their claims – formal titles. Land conflict will be minimal when governments supply property rights
to first possessors. But, governments may not allocate de jure rights to these claimants because they
face differing political constituencies.  Moreover, governments may assign de jure rights but be unwilling
to enforce the right. This generates potential or actual conflict over land depending on the violence
potentials of de facto and de jure claimants. We examine land settlement and conflict on the frontiers
of Australia, the U.S. and Brazil. We are interested in examining the emergence, sustainability, and
collapse of commons arrangements in specific historical contexts. Our analysis indicates the emergence
of de facto property rights arrangements will be relatively peaceful where claimants have reasons to
organize collectively (Australia and the U.S.). The settlement process will be more prone to conflict
when fewer collective activities are required. Consequently, claimants resort to periodic violent self-enforcement
or third party enforcement (Brazil). In all three cases the movement from de facto to de jure property
rights led to potential or actual conflict because of insufficient government enforcement.
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                    ,                                           (1) 
And the return to effort is:  
        
     
      
       ,    0                                   (2) 
The optimal amount of effort is given by: 
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This expression can be used to determine the effect of a change of the value of land under 
private property on claimant i's optimal effort? 
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1862  2449  207675   
1863  1630  121493   
1864  1166  86475   
1865  1050  70432   
1866  2022  196043   
1867  1568  140511   
1868  1584  129634   
1869  2361  227992   
1870  2105  184287  3148  322592 
1871  2117  195043  5248  487256 
1872  3019  346585  9179  797176 
1873  4761  619386  8144  1063066 
1874  4844  693489  11071  1831698 
1875  4632  738523  7091  183520 
1876  3994  933713  6482  1040356 
1877  3578  715440  7017  1126492 
1878  3842  703902  9058  1915129 
1879  2625  468121  6688  1032214 





























1863  2449  16.90    
1864  1630  10.74    
1865  1166  18.61    
1866  1050  40.48    
1867  2022  13.01    
1868  1568  15.37    
1869  1584  26.89    
1870  2361  14.65    
1871  2105  18.19    
1872  2117  36.61    
1873  3019  48.33    
1874  4761  39.68  9578  0.02 
1875  4844  48.27  6320  0.16 
1876  4632  45.88  5785  1.33 
1877  3994  44.79  6240  3.56 
1878  3578  50.45  7524  3.62 
1879  3842  27.38  5726  4.96 
1880  2625  53.75  4036  8.77 
1881  2867  66.93  3110  2.38 
1882  4983  19.93  4383  1.32 





















1862  2449  1240  50.63  162  6.61 
1863  1630  996  61.10  178  10.92 
1864  1166  729  62.52  258  22.13 
1865  1050  645  61.43  250  23.81 
1866  2022  1298  64.19  629  31.11 
1867  1568  1020  65.05  244  15.56 
1868  1584  1031  65.09  207  13.07 
1869  2361  1510  63.96  245  10.38 
1870  2105  1331  63.23  209  9.93 
1871  2117  1279  60.42  221  10.44 
1872  3019  1829  60.58  741  24.54 
1873  4761  2777  58.33  1089  22.87 
1874  4844  2779  57.37  889  18.35 
1875  4632  2661  57.45  714  15.41 
1876  3994  2556  64.00  250  6.26 
1877  3578  2128  59.47  209  5.84 
1878  3842  2011  52.34  268  6.98 
1879  2625  1090  41.52  129  4.91 
1880  2867  354  12.35  43  1.50 
1881  4983  23  0.46  13  0.26 
1882  5158  3  0.06  11  0.21 
 
Source: Adapted from Morris and Ranken (1883) 
 